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Introduction 
 
In light of the longstanding economic crisis the need for corporate rescue culture has been 
evolving in Europe and across the rest of the world. Great emphasis has been placed on 
rescue at an early stage and it appears that more and more rescue is attempted at a pre-
insolvency stage, so as to enhance the likelihood of a successful reorganisation.1 The aim of 
this paper is to consider the pre-insolvency procedures available in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa. In particular the paper provides an overview of the CVA procedure and the 
Schemes of Arrangement in the United Kingdom as well as the Business Rescue and the 
Compromise procedures in South Africa. In conclusion, the paper aims to provide an 
overview of the approach taken in both jurisdictions towards less formal restructurings by 
‘key players’ in insolvency, such as insolvency practitioners and secured creditors as well as 
the courts.  
 
The advantages of early-stage intervention 
 
Although various formal and informal steps may be taken in order to give effect to a 
successful rescue, it is submitted that a traumatised company will often benefit from 
intervention before it gets to the stage of actual insolvency. In fact, it has been noted that 
most rescues are achieved through informal or less formal rescue, that is, rescue without 
recourse to the formal insolvency proceedings. 2  Less formal, pre-insolvency rescue 
                                                 
* Senior lecturer in law in the Nottingham Law School at Nottingham Trent University. 
** Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of the Free State.  
1 See S Frisby, “Report to the Insolvency Service: Insolvency Outcomes” (Insolvency Service, London June 
2006). 
2 Ibid.  
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mechanisms have a variety of advantages for the ailing company. From a director’s and also a 
shareholder’s perspective, engaging in less formal rescue is preferable as it prevents any 
adverse publicity in relation to the company’s financial troubles and hence protects its 
goodwill and reputation. 3  It could be argued that, by pursuing less formal rescue, the 
company can effectively avoid the stigma which is attached to corporate failure and that the 
realisable value of its assets can be protected.4 Moreover, one could argue that less formal 
rescue is not as costly as formal insolvency proceedings, since the involvement of the court is 
very limited. In addition, since there is little court involvement in pre-insolvency rescue, one 
could argue that the process is more flexible. 
 
Furthermore, as opposed to completely informal reorganisation, 5  a semi-formal 
reorganisation under the Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United Kingdom could 
prove more effective, as far as consent is concerned, since an approval in excess of 75% in 
value would suffice. Arguably the fact that there is no need to obtain the consent of all the 
creditors under a CVA avoids the flaws and challenges of informal rescue6, as obtaining 
consent from dissenting creditors could prove to be a time-consuming and expensive course 
of action.7 In the South African context it also worth noting that regardless of who initiates 
                                                 
3 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, (2nd ed. Cambridge, 2009) at p. 278. 
4 Ibid, at p.p251-252. 
5 Where a reorganisation process is of a contractual nature, hence there is great reliance on a consensus being 
achieved with the creditors. 
6 J Payne, “Debt restructuring in English law: lessons from the United States and the need for reform” (2014) 
130 LQR 282-305, at p. 287 
7 It could be said that a formal procedure, such as the Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United Kingdom, 
could prove more effective, as far as consent is concerned, since an approval in excess of 75% in value would 
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the rescue proceedings, the business rescue will only continue if the creditors accepts the 
business rescue plan. Of course there is no need for a unanimous vote of acceptance and the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 therefore provides that the plan will be accepted if it was 
supported by the holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ voting interest,8 and the votes in 
support of the plan included at least 50% of the independent creditors’ voting interest that 
were voted.9  The South African business rescue proceedings thus also bind a dissenting 
minority. 
 
It could be argued that early intervention is a key for successful corporate rescue. 
Accordingly, the insolvency law regimes of both the United Kingdom and South Africa make 
provision for early intervention proceedings. These proceedings are being increasingly used 
before the technical moment of insolvency and are “colonizing” the area formerly occupied 
by formal insolvency procedures. For instance, in the United Kingdom procedures are in 
place, which are designed to encourage an early stage intervention by the existing 
management, such as the Scheme of Arrangement, which is one of the oldest rescue devices 
in the world and the CVA procedure, which was introduced following the recommendations 
of the Cork Report. 10 In South Africa directors are also encouraged to initiate business rescue 
proceedings as soon as possible; in order to assist the board of directors from allegations of 
                                                                                                                                                        
suffice. A Part 26, Companies Act 2006 scheme of arrangement could also be used for solvent entities, which 
would have the same effect. 
8 Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 152(2) (a). 
9 Ibid, section 152(2) (b). An independent creditor is described in section 128(1) (g) as a person who is a 
creditor of the company, including an employee of the company who is a creditor in terms of section 144(2) and 
who is not related to the company, a director or the practitioner. 
10 The Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 858 (1982, 
HMSO, London). 
4 
 
abuse of process the Act widened the definition of ‘financial distress’ by introducing a six 
month time period. The new mixed management displacement model in South Africa also 
encourages directors to initiate proceedings sooner.11  
 
 
Pre-insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom  
 
The development of a corporate rescue culture in the United Kingdom  
 
 
A financially ailing company may have resort to a range of mechanisms in the United 
Kingdom, such as for instance, informal workouts, a Company Voluntary Arrangement, a 
Scheme of Arrangement or administration. Arguably, the presence of such a wide range of 
reorganisation proceedings demonstrates the significance attached to business recovery in this 
jurisdiction. However, it was not until relatively recently that the United Kingdom established 
its sophisticated corporate rescue culture.  
 
Prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 86), there were only two formal 
possible procedures designed to keep ‘alive’ a traumatised business, the administrative 
receivership procedure or a scheme of arrangement. Nonetheless, the application of these to 
procedures was not without problems, as the administrative receivership procedure was 
conditional upon the exercise of the right of a floating charge holder to appoint an 
administrative receiver; in addition, the use of a scheme of arrangement as a corporate rescue 
                                                 
11 Companies Act 71 of 2008: section 137(2) (a)-(c) and 140 (1) (a).  Under Business Rescue the company’s 
management is displaced by an independent third party known as the Business Rescue Practitioner. Even though 
the management is displaced the directors are not removed from office and stay on in order to assist the 
Practitioner in his duties, this is done under the supervision of the practitioner. 
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tool was limited, primarily because the procedure was too ‘procedurally cumbersome and 
failed to safeguard sufficient and effective protection for the company.12 
 
In 1985 by means of a text, later re-enacted as the IA 86,13 two additional procedures were 
introduced as alternative means for corporate rescue, namely the administration procedure 
and the company voluntary arrangement (‘CVA’). The innovative reforms introduced by the 
IA 86, originally had their roots in the 1982 report of the Cork Committee, 14  which 
recognised the need to strengthen the United Kingdom’s corporate rescue regime. The Cork 
Report stated that a ‘good, modern system of insolvency law should provide a means for 
preserving viable commercial enterprises capable of making a useful contribution to the 
economic life of the country’.15 However, it should be noted that, although the CVA appeared 
to be a promising ‘debtor in possession’ reorganisation tool, it was not fully embraced by 
practitioners.  
However, the Enterprise Act 2002 together with the Insolvency Act 2000 contributed 
significantly to the development of a corporate rescue culture in the United Kingdom. The 
Insolvency Act 2000 introduced key reforms to the CVA procedure, so that the CVA now 
constitutes an important part of the current trend in shifting the ethos of the United 
Kingdom’s insolvency law towards effective corporate rescue.  
 
 
                                                 
12 R Parry, “United Kingdom: Administrative Receiverships and Administrations” in Gromek Broc, K., and 
Parry, R., Corporate Rescue in Europe: An overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries in 
Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2004) at p. 265.   
13 The Insolvency Act 1985 was consolidated as the Insolvency Act 1986.   
14Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, (Cmnd. 8558, 1982) (‘Cork Report’).    
15 V Finch, note 3 above, at p. 246.   
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An overview of the CVA procedure 
The CVA was designed primarily with the aim of promoting corporate rescue. The objective 
of the CVA is to facilitate the rehabilitation of a financially troubled company by enabling it 
to reach a contractual compromise with its creditors. The CVA may be used as a stand-alone 
procedure or it may be combined with another procedure, such as administration. In other 
words, the procedure may be initiated either by the company’s directors or by an 
administrator. Although the CVA may be effectively used as an exit route from 
administration, strictly speaking, it is not a formal insolvency procedure, as it is not necessary 
for the company to be insolvent or show that it is unable to pay its debts in order to enter into 
a CVA.  
 
Where the CVA is initiated as a freestanding procedure, the existing management of a 
company is able to take early action by drafting a re-organisation proposal and presenting it 
to the company’s creditors. The directors16 are also entrusted with the implementation of the 
proposal under the supervision of a licenced insolvency practitioner, known as the “nominee” 
prior to approval of the proposal and as the “supervisor” after approval.17  
  
 
The formation of the proposal is a key stage of the reorganisation process. The directors form 
the proposal18 which inter alia, states the reasons why the company’s directors believe that a 
CVA is desirable; the company’s assets and their value; details of assets charged in favor of 
creditors; the nature and the amount of the company’s liabilities; the duration of the CVA; the 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that although the CVA is described largely as a ‘Debtor in Possession’ regime, in practice 
the directors heavily rely on the insolvency practitioner to both draft and execute the proposal.  
17  It is important to note that the insolvency practitioner must remain independent from the outset and 
throughout the implementation of the CVA process. See Statement of Insolvency Practice 3, para 3.2. 
18 Insolvency Act 1986, s 1(1). 
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dates of distributions to creditors; the identity and the remuneration of the insolvency 
practitioner of the proposed nominee/supervisor.19 
 
The steps that directors must take in forming and implementing a CVA proposal depend on 
whether or not the protection of a moratorium is sought. 20  Arguably, one of the most 
significant reforms the CVA has been subject to is the introduction of provisions enabling a 
moratorium to be obtained while the CVA is being proposed.21 However, notwithstanding the 
introduction of a reformed CVA, it could be said that the impact of the procedure has been 
limited. An obvious contributing factor to the limited use of the CVA could arguably be the 
fact that a moratorium is only available to “small companies”. 22  However, since large 
companies can still benefit from a moratorium (if one is necessary) by simply entering into 
administration proceedings, the lack of it under the CVA has not been identified as a major 
flaw by insolvency practitioners. In addition, it could be argued that the use of the CVA has 
been relatively limited, due to the fact that the procedure has been overshadowed by the 
streamlined administration procedure.23  
 
                                                 
19 See Insolvency Rules 1986, r.1.3. (1) - (8). 
20 Where directors intend to apply for a moratorium the procedure which must be followed is stated in s.2 IA 
1986, supplemented by the Insolvency Rules 1986, Part 1 Chapter 2. Where a moratorium is not required, the 
procedure is outlined in IA 1986 Schedule A1. 
21 R Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), at p.136, para. 10-09.  
22 See s.382 (3) of the Companies Act 2006, which states that a company qualifies as small in relation to a 
subsequent financial year, if it satisfies at least two of the following ‘qualifying conditions’: a) its turnover does 
not exceed £6.5 million; b) its balance sheet total is not more than £3.26 million; c) it has no more than 50 
employees.   
23 R Parry, note 21 above, at p. 136, para. 10-09. 
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The role of the nominee  
 
The nominee has a very important role to serve, as he must establish whether or not the 
company is able to implement a CVA proposal. Accordingly, the nominee must present a 
report to the court stating whether in his opinion meetings of the company and its creditors 
should consider the proposal.24 In order to be able to assess the company’s suitability and to 
prepare his report, the nominee must receive a copy of the proposal from the directors,25 a 
statement of the company’s affairs,26 as well as any other information he requires.27 
The nominee shall summon meetings of the company and its creditors28 in order to either 
approve (with or without modifications)29 or reject the proposed CVA. After the conclusion 
of either meeting the chairman of the meeting shall report the result of the meeting to the 
court, and, immediately after reporting to the court, shall give notice of the result of the 
meeting to such persons as may be prescribed.30 
 
With regard to the approval of the proposal, it is important to note that as opposed to a 
scheme of arrangement, the CVA treats all creditors as one single class. 31 All creditors who 
                                                 
24 S. 2 (2) of the Insolvency Act 1986,. 
25 S. 2(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986; Insolvency Rules 1986 r.1.4. (1), (2). 
26  Insolvency Rules 1986 r.1.5. 
27 Insolvency Rules 1986 r.1.6. 
28 Sch. A1 Insolvency Act 1986, para.29. 
29Sch. A1 Insolvency Act 1986, para.31. 
30 Sch. A1 Insolvency Act 1986, para. 30(3).  
31  See I Fletcher, “UK Corporate Rescue Culture: Recent Developments- Changes To Administrative 
Receivership, Administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements- The Insolvency Act 2000, The White 
Paper and The Enterprise Act 2002” (2004)5 EBOR 119-151, at p.127. 
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receive notice of a creditors’ meeting can vote on a CVA32 draft.  In order for the CVA to 
become effective, it needs to be approved by the requisite majority at the meeting.33 The 
CVA is treated as a statutory contract34, which bounds every person who was eligible to vote 
at the meeting regardless of whether they were present or not and whether they voted in 
favour or not of the proposed arrangement. 35  Upon approval of the CVA, the nominee 
becomes the supervisor.36   
 
An important disadvantage of the CVA procedure is its vulnerability to claims of unfair 
prejudice to the interest of a creditor or member under the approved CVA. In addition the 
CVA is vulnerable to challenge on grounds of material irregularities. Such claims may be 
initiated by any person, who would be eligible to vote at the meeting, or any person who 
would have been entitled to vote had they had notice of the meeting. In any case no challenge 
can be made after a period of 28 days (a) beginning with the first day on which the 
Chairman’s report required has been made to the court; or (b) in the case of a person who was 
not given notice of the creditors’ meeting, after the end of the period of 28 days beginning 
with the day on which he became aware that the meeting had taken place.37 
 
Schemes of arrangement: 
 
                                                 
32 Persons who are not entitled to vote at the meeting, ae not bound by the CVA. See s.5(2) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986.  
33 Insolvency Rules 1986 r.1.19: more than three quarters in value of the creditors voting on the resolution must 
vote in favour of the arrangement. 
34 Johnson v Davies [1999] Ch.117, 129H-130A. 
35 Sch. A 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, s.37. 
36 Sch. A 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, s.39 (2). 
37 Sch. A 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, s.38 (3). 
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A scheme of arrangement is one of the oldest restructuring procedures available in the United 
Kingdom. 38  However, strictly speaking a scheme is not an exclusive corporate rescue 
instrument, as it was primarily designed to be used by solvent companies. Accordingly, as the 
scheme is a creature of company law39, when compared to CVAs, it is not as stigmatised. 
Similarly to the CVA, a scheme enables a financially ailing company to reach a compromise 
with its creditors. However, in contrast to the CVA, the popularity of the scheme, as a rescue 
device has been steadily rising over the last few decades40 and practitioners have favoured the 
use of schemes in a number of high profile debt restructuring cases.41  
 
The scheme is a compromise between the company and its creditors, or between the company 
and its members. Similarly to the CVA, the company’s directors remain in office and are 
responsible for the drafting and the execution of the restructuring plan.  The process of 
implementing a scheme involves three distinct stages: a) formulation of the proposal and an 
application to the court; b) a creditors’ meeting for approval of the scheme; and c) a ‘sanction 
hearing’ by the court.   
 
As part of stage one, the board directors shall form the restructuring plan,42 which is then 
proposed on behalf of the company to its members and creditors. Once a 
                                                 
38 It dates back to the Joint Stock Companies (Arrangement) Act 1870. 
39 The statutory regime relating to schemes is set out in Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006.  
40 R Parry, note 21 above, at p. 233. See Also V Finch, note 3 above, at p. 486, where it is argued that the 
revived popularity of schemes of arrangement may be due to the courts ‘constructive attitude, to facilitate the 
implementation of schemes by means of assessing junior creditors’ ‘real economic interests’. 
41 Such as Crest Nicholson plc, McCarthy & Stone plc, Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA and European 
Directories Group. 
42 Although the appointment of a qualified insolvency practitioner is not necessary, typically directors seek the 
advice of restructuring experts at this early stage.  
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compromise/arrangement has been proposed, the company by sending preliminary circulars43 
shall inform its creditors or members about the objectives of the scheme as well as the 
relevant meetings (if more than one) the company aims to call. The company must also select 
the classes in which the creditors or members affected by the scheme should be placed and 
accordingly notify them. The division of classes depends on how similar44 the rights of the 
members of each class are. However, it is not necessary that their rights are exactly the 
same.45 Finally, stage one involves an application being made to the court, which will have to 
decide whether or not to make a “meetings order”.46 
 
Stage two involves a meeting of creditors or members who will decide whether to approve 
the scheme. However, it is required that, prior to the meeting, sufficient information must be 
circulated so as to enable the creditors to reach an informed decision.47 As mentioned above 
the approval of a scheme of arrangement involves a complex voting structure under which, 
for voting purposes, creditors are divided into classes and it is required that a reorganization 
arrangement be approved by a majority vote of all classes of creditors.48 
                                                 
43 However, compliance with this requirement may be waived by the court in exceptional cases. See for instance 
Marconi Corp Plc v Marconi Plc [2003] EWHC 663.   
44 The interests of creditors in each class should not be so dissimilar so as to make it impossible for them to 
consult together with a view to their common interest. See Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1982] 2 QB 
573, 583; and Re BTR Plc [1999] 2 BCLC 575. 
45 Re Osiris Insurance Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 182. 
46 At the meetings hearing the court will consider whether or not the company has appropriately identified the 
classes, which will have to consider the scheme. See Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2002] BCC 300. 
47 See s. 897 of the Companies Act 2006. 
48 See s. 899 of the Companies Act 2006, which states: If a majority in number representing 75% in value of the 
creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members (as the case may be), present and voting either in 
person or by proxy at the meeting summoned under section 896, agree a compromise or arrangement, the court 
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In comparing the complex approval process of a scheme to the much simpler process of a 
CVA, it could be argued that restructuring by means of a CVA should be preferable. 
Nevertheless, the simplicity aspect of the CVA is outweighed by the fact that, once an 
arrangement becomes binding under the scheme, it binds all creditors (including dissenting 
creditors), whereas an agreement reached under the CVA is only binding upon creditors who 
were eligible to vote, or who would have been eligible to vote, if they had notice of a 
creditors’ meeting. In addition, it is important to note that, under a scheme of arrangement, it 
is not necessary to consult any class of creditors who have no real economic interest in the 
company, hence their votes on the scheme may be disregarded. 49  This is a significant 
advantage of a scheme as it provides greater finality than a CVA, which is vulnerable to 
challenges on grounds on unfair prejudice.50 
 
Stage three involves a “sanction hearing”, where the court will consider whether or not to 
sanction the scheme.51 Once the scheme has obtained the required level of approval, it must 
be sanctioned by the court and the court’s order takes effect once a copy of it is delivered to 
the Registrar of Companies.52 It should be noted that the sanctioning of the scheme is not a 
simple rubber-stamping exercise. Instead, the court may not sanction a scheme even where it 
                                                                                                                                                        
may, on an application under this section, sanction the compromise or arrangement. However, see also Charles 
Maunder, ‘Bondholder Schemes of Arrangement: Playing the Numbers Game’ (2003)16(10) Insolv. Int. 73-77, 
76, where it is argued that if the majority in number requirement was removed, schemes of arrangement would 
be more flexible and attractive restructuring tools. 
49 See Re Tea Corp. [1904] 1 Ch. 12. See also Re My Travel Group Plc [2004] EWHC 2741; [2005] 1 WLR 
2365, where the basis of valuation of entitlements caused some contention. See also R Parry, note 22 above, p. 
236; and V Finch, note 3 above, at p.486. 
50 R Parry, note 21 above, at p. 233. 
51  Ibid, at p. 236. 
52 Companies Act s.899 (1) & (4) 
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has received the approval of creditors, 53 as it must be satisfied that the classes were fairly 
represented by the parties who attended the meeting,54 and that the terms of the scheme are 
fair. 55  In addition, the court has discretion to refuse to sanction a scheme, unless it is 
convinced that all the procedural requirements have been complied with.56 It is argued that 
the requirement that a scheme of arrangement has to be approved by the court is a significant 
advantage of the procedure, because, once the arrangement has been court-approved, it 
cannot be challenged by the company’s creditors or its members. It could be argued that this 
might be one of the primary reasons why such schemes seem to be more popular than the 
CVA, as a CVA may be challenged on the grounds of unfair prejudice.57   
 
 
Pre-insolvency proceedings in South Africa 
 
 
A very large premium has been placed on retaining jobs and businesses in South Africa,58 and 
as an emerging market economy an efficient rescue system is of the utmost importance. 
South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008 heralded a new era of corporate rescue for 
financially distressed corporations by replacing the largely unsuccessful Judicial 
                                                 
53 Jennifer Payne, “Debt restructuring in English law: lessons from the United States and the need for reform 
(2014) L.Q.R 130(Apr) 282-305, at p.292. 
54 R Parry, note 21 above, at p. 238. 
55 Ibid, at p. 239-247. 
56 Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Rly Co [1891] 1 Ch. 213, 245. 
57 R Parry note 22 above, at p. 233. 
58 D Burdette, “Some initial thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 
for South Africa (Part 1)” (2004) SA Merc LJ 16: 241- 263, at p 241. 
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Management Procedure. 59 Chapter 6 of the Act dealing with Business Rescue and 
Compromises also replaces the section on compromises and arrangements contained in the 
previous Companies Act of 1973.60 Thus the Act currently provides for two Pre-insolvency 
proceedings: the Business Rescue procedure and the Compromise with creditors.  
 
Both the mechanisms contained in Chapter 6 provide a debtor in financial distress with access 
to corporate reorganisation in order to try and circumvent insolvency. The Business Rescue 
provisions can be regarded as a more traditional type of procedure that can be likened to the 
Administration procedure under the English Enterprise Act.61 Under Business Rescue the 
company’s management is displaced by an independent third party known as the Business 
Rescue Practitioner. Even though the management is displaced the directors are not removed 
from office and stay on in order to assist the Practitioner in his duties, this is done under the 
supervision of the practitioner. 62  The Compromise provisions provide for an alternative 
option with less involvement from the court and practitioners, in this sense it is reminiscent of 
the US Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession in that the debtor is able to stay in control of its 
affairs although it is a simpler provision than the Chapter 11 procedure.63 This mechanism 
provides for a more flexible framework and can even be utilised by companies that are not 
experiencing financial distress. 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid. See also E Snyman-van Deventer and L Jacobs, “Corporate Rescue: The South African Business Rescue 
Plan Examined” (2014) NIBLeJ 103-115, at p 103. 
60 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
61 H Klopper and R Bradstreet, “Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: does a section 155 Compromise 
Place the bar too high?” (2014) Stell LR 549- 565, at p. 550. 
62 S. 137(2) (a)-(c) and 140 (1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
63 See note 61 above at p. 553. 
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Although the new corporate rescue procedures in South Africa are more informal than under 
the previous Act, the procedures that are currently available to distressed companies are still 
more formal than informal in nature since it is highly regulated by legislation. Informal 
creditor workouts are rarely heard of nor are they documented.64 The Chapter 6 mechanisms 
are less formal since the involvement of the courts have been limited whilst the involvement 
of other stakeholders have been broadened. A discussion on the development of a rescue 
culture as well as an overview of the two reorganisation options will now follow. 
 
The development of a rescue culture in South Africa 
South Africa is still struggling with a liquidation culture despite the fact that South Africa 
now has modern rescue provisions to aid failing debtors. The process of moving towards a 
rescue culture is happening very slowly. This liquidation culture emanates from South 
Africa’s prevailing creditor-friendly approach to insolvency matters. 65  It is, however, of 
importance to mention that even though the shift is happening at a very slow pace, it is indeed 
happening. In recent years, since the inception of the Companies Act of 2008, there has been 
more emphasis on the protection of the interests of all the relevant stakeholders. It has even 
been stated by the court that Business Rescue is to be preferred to the liquidation of the 
company and that the old mind-set of the creditor being almost entitled to a winding-up order 
as of a right was inappropriate.66 One of the biggest hurdles to overcome in creating a rescue 
                                                 
64N Harvey, Turnaround Management and Corporate Renewal. A South African Perspective, (Johannesburg ed. 
2011) at p. 134. 
65 See D Burdette, note 58 above, at p. 244; Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd 2012(2) SA 423 (WCC); Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein 
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd 2012(3) SA 273 (GSJ): 276. “By law the creditor of an ailing company had a right ex debito 
justitiae (as of right) to liquidate the company.” 
66 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC) 
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culture in South Africa is the larger creditors, e.g. the Banks who are to a large degree very 
reluctant to participate in, or even support the rescue proceedings because of the 
aforementioned reasoning. And although creditors still play an overwhelming role in the 
outcome of reorganisation procedures, 67  there seems to be a shift to a more inclusive 
approach to the rescue of a company albeit at a very slow pace.  
 
Business Rescue  
 
According to section 7 of the Act one of the main purposes thereof is to provide for the 
efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances 
the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.68 The Act provides for proceedings to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by providing for: the 
temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, business and 
property; a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in 
respect of property in its possession; and the development and implementation, if approved, 
of a plan to rescue the company.69 
 
The first topic to discuss in this regard pertains to the concept of imminent insolvency in a 
South African context. When will a company be regarded as being in financial distress? It is a 
well-known fact that time is of the essence in corporate reorganisations. Section 128 of the 
Act states that a company will be deemed to be financially distressed if it appears to be 
reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as they become due 
                                                 
67  A Loubser, “The Role of Shareholders during Corporate Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside 
Looking In?” (2008) SA Merc LJ. 20: 372-390, at p. 379. 
68 S.7 (k) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
69 Ibid, s.128 (1) (b) (i)-(iii). 
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and payable within the immediately ensuing six months,70 or if it appears to be reasonably 
likely that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six months71 
The adding of the six month time period was to encourage the early commencement of 
Business Rescue which in turn maximises the chance of a successful rescue. The formulation 
of the concept of financial distress in the Act also refers to commercial and factual insolvency 
at a future date implying that Business Rescue should not be utilised by companies that are 
already insolvent. South African courts agree with this and have at numerous occasions 
denied applications for the initiation of Business rescue where the companies are insolvent 
and not in financial distress.72 
The initiation of the procedure can happen either voluntarily by way of a company resolution 
or by application to the High Court by an affected person. An affected person is defined in 
the Act as a shareholder or creditor of the company, any registered trade union representing 
employees of the company and any employees of the company not represented by a trade 
union.73  
                                                 
70 Ibid, s. 128(1)(f)(i). Referring to the so called cash flow test for insolvency. 
71 Ibid, s. 128(1)(f)(ii). Referring to the so called balance sheet test for insolvency. 
72 Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd (Unreported case). “It must either be unlikely that the 
debts can be repaid within 6 months or that the company will go insolvent within the ensuing 6 months. In this 
case the company is presently insolvent and cannot pay its debts unless a moratorium of 3-5 years is granted. 
The facts of this matter does not bring West City’s financial situation within the definition of ‘financially 
distressed’”. See also Wellman v Marcelle Props 193 2012 JDR 0408 GSJ: 12. “In my view, Business Rescue 
proceedings are not for the terminally ill close corporation.”. Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v 
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC). African Banking Corporation of Botswana v 
Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69. “Suffice it to say that the company was clearly 
hopelessly insolvent and effectively dormant in that it had not traded for years and had no business contacts in 
place.” 
73 S. 128(1) (a) (i)-(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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The commencement standard that applies depends on the party that initiates the rescue 
process, providing for different requirements for when the debtor initiates to when an affected 
person applies to court for an order placing the company under Business Rescue. This is a 
positive development, 74  as it also allows for different evidential burdens taking the 
circumstances and information position of the different role players into account. The new 
requirements for initiating Business Rescue are seen as an improvement to the requirements 
under the previous Companies Act of 1973. Some believe that the evidential burden imposed 
by the previous Act was unrealistic, outdated and excessive, and resulted in rescuable 
companies being denied a lifeline. Others argue that the courts wrongly interpreted judicial 
management as an extraordinary remedy, only to be granted in exceptional circumstances.75  
 
Under the Business Rescue model a company may voluntarily initiate rescue proceedings and 
place the company under supervision, by taking a resolution, if the board has reasonable 
grounds to firstly, believe that the company is financially distressed and secondly, that there 
appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.76 An affected person, on the 
other hand, may apply to court to make an order placing the company under supervision and 
commencing business rescue proceedings, if the court is satisfied that the company is 
financially distressed; the company has failed to make an employment-related payment 
arising from a regulatory or contractual obligation or if it is otherwise just and equitable to do 
so for financial reasons, and there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.77 The 
court’s involvement has therefor been limited at the commencement of the proceedings. The 
                                                 
74 Under the 1973 Companies Act only one set of requirements was applicable regardless of who was initiating 
the rescue procedure. 
75 See D Burdette note 58 above, at pp.248 - 249. 
76 S. 129 (1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
77 S. 131(4) (a) (i)-(iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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debtor is fully aware of its own financial situation, and would be the most appropriate judge 
to decide when to make use of rescue provisions.78 A rescue mechanism that relies heavily on 
the involvement of the court is expensive and therefor contradictory to the aim of helping the 
company in dire financial straits. 
 
The most problematic requirement for South African courts to date has been the need for a 
reasonable prospect of rescue to exist.79 This is mainly due to the fact that the meaning of 
“successful rescue” is a contentious issue and will depend on the viewpoint from which it is 
regarded and also because there is no way in which to determine the viability of the debtor 
company. According to the Act a successful rescue could include returning the company to 
solvency or alternatively bringing about a better return for the company’s creditors and 
shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the company.80 
 
After the commencement of the proceedings, the appointment of the Business Rescue 
Practitioner should take place. If the company initiates the proceedings the Practitioner will 
be appointed by the board of the company.81 If, however, the procedure is initiated by an 
affected person the applicant to court would nominate a practitioner and the court will 
appoint an interim Practitioner, subject to the ratification by the creditors.82 The Practitioner 
is a key role player in the rescue procedure and the duty to rescue the company falls on his 
                                                 
78 D Burdette, “Some initial thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 
for South Africa (Part 2)” (2004) SA Merc LJ 16: 409-447, p 410. 
79 M Pretorius, “Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) Status Quo Report” (2015) at p. 5. 
80 S. 128(1) (b) (iii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
81 S. 129(3) (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
82 S. 131 (5) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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shoulders. It is for this reason that the Practitioner should be suitably qualified and 
experienced in order to perform all that is expected of him. 
 
According to the 2008 Companies Act a Practitioner should be a member of the law, 
accounting or business management profession. 83  The regulations to the act furthermore 
stipulate that a practitioner should have experience in "business turnaround practice".84 The 
2008 Act places more emphasis on the experience of the business rescue practitioner than its 
predecessor. Practitioners are therefore divided into three categories: senior practitioners, 
experienced practitioners and junior practitioners. For large and state-owned companies only 
senior practitioners may be appointed. For medium companies senior and experienced 
practitioners may be appointed, but not junior practitioners; etcetera.85 This clearly indicates 
that the legislature wanted to make sure that only the most experienced practitioners are 
appointed in the larger and more difficult rescue situations in order to optimise the chances of 
a successful rescue of the company. Apart from being suitably qualified and experienced, the 
Practitioner also needs to be of good character and integrity, 86  and be independent and 
objective.87 The duties of the Practitioner include taking control of the management of the 
debtor company, undertaking an investigation into the financial affairs of the company and 
the drafting and implementation, if approved, of a business rescue plan. In order to assist the 
Practitioner in performing these duties, the Act affords him with a wide array of powers 
                                                 
83 S. 138 (1) (a) Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
84 Regulation 127, Regulations to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
85 Regulation 127 (2) (c) (i)-(iii), Regulations to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
86 Regulation 126(4) (a), Regulations to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
87 S. 138 (1) (e) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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including the power to obtain post-commencement financing and suspending certain 
contracts or parts thereof88. 
 
The drafting, acceptance and implementation of a business rescue plan are among the most 
important aspects of a modern rescue model.89 The business rescue plan is one of the greatest 
improvements in respect of the South African rescue model. By having to propose, accept 
and implement a business rescue plan, the restructuring of the debtor could occur much 
sooner, with the added benefit that certainty with regard to the outcome of the rescue is 
created for all parties concerned.90 The business rescue plan will be considered at a meeting 
of affected persons and voted upon by the company’s creditors. The shareholders will only be 
allowed to vote if the plan alters the rights attached to their shares. At this meeting, the 
Rescue Practitioner must present the proposed rescue plan to the creditors and shareholders to 
afford them the opportunity to consider it.91 The practitioner must also use this opportunity to 
inform the meeting of whether he still believes that there is a reasonable prospect of the 
company being rescued. 92  The creditors and shareholders may then discuss and raise 
arguments about the plan, as well as cast any vote on a motion regarding the amendment of 
the plan or the adjournment of the meeting to afford the practitioner time to revise the plan 
based on their recommendations.93 When a vote is called, the proposed business rescue plan 
                                                 
88 Ss. 135-136 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
89 P Kloppers, “Judicial Management - A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?” (1999) 10 Stell 
LR 417 - 435, at p. 427. See also E Snyman-van Deventer and L Jacobs, “Corporate Rescue: The South African 
Business Rescue Plan Examined” (2014) NIBLeJ 103-115, at p 103. 
90 D Burdette, note 78 above, at p. 438. 
91 S. 152 (1) (a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
92S. 152 (1) (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
93 S. 152 (1) (c), (d) (i) - (ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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will be approved if the plan received support from the holders of more than 75% of the 
creditors’ voting interests that were voted,94 and if the votes in support of the proposed plan 
included at least 50% of the independent creditors’ voting interests, if any, that were voted.95 
A business rescue plan approved in the abovementioned ways is binding on the company, 
each of the creditors of the company, and each holder of company securities, whether or not 
that person was present at the meeting or voted in favour of the plan.96 This means that the 
vote will also bind the minority of dissenting creditors. 
 
Another important aspect to consider regarding Business Rescue pertains to the automatic 
“stay” or moratorium that becomes effective upon commencement of the proceedings. The 
moratorium on claims from creditors provides the debtor company with some breathing room 
in order to try and facilitate the rescue procedure.97 For the duration of the Business Rescue 
proceedings, no legal proceeding against the company, or in relation to any of the company 
property, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum, except with the written 
consent of the practitioner or with leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the 
court deems suitable.98 
 
The termination of the Business Rescue proceedings can happen in a number of ways. In 
terms of section 132 the proceedings will come to an end if the court sets aside the 
company’s resolution to place the company under rescue,99 or if the court has converted the 
                                                 
94 S. 152 (2) (a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
95 S. 152 (2) (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
96 S. 152 (4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
97 D Burdette, note 78 above, at p 417. 
98 S. 133(1) (a)-(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
99 S. 132(2) (a) (i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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proceedings to liquidation proceedings.100 The Practitioner can also terminate the rescue by 
filing a notice of termination.101 In the event that the business rescue plan is rejected, the 
proceedings will also come to an end.102 The proceedings will also come to an end when the 
Practitioner files a notice of substantial implementation of the plan.103 
 
The Compromise procedure 
 
The alternative procedure provided for in the Act is the section 155 Compromise with 
creditors.104 In the case of a compromise with creditors the debtor company will remain 
entirely in possession and no Practitioner will be appointed in order to assist the company. 
This type of procedure envisages some element of commercial give and take and 
accommodation on both sides. That is between the Company and its creditors.  
 
The board of a company may propose an arrangement or a compromise of its financial 
obligations to all of its creditors, or to all of the members of any class of its creditors, by 
delivering a proposal to every creditor and the Commission. The company must therefore 
develop their own plan for “rescue”. The prescribed contents of the plan for a compromise 
are similar to those of the business rescue plan.105 The proposal will then be voted upon by all 
the creditors or the class of creditors and will only be adopted if supported by a majority in 
number, representing at least 75% in value of the creditors or class, as the case may be.106  
                                                 
100 S. 132(2) (a) (ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
101 S. 132 (2) (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
102 S. 132 (2) (c) (i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
103 S. 132 (2) (c) (ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
104 S. 155 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
105 S. 155 (3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
106 S. 155(6) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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The section 155 Compromise or arrangement under the Companies Act of 2008 replaces the 
old section 311 procedure of the previous Act. Like the previous procedure, the section 155 
Compromise also provides for the court to sanction a compromise that was reached between 
the company and the majority of its creditors.107 The wording of the Act does, however, 
create uncertainty regarding the need for the court to sanction the proposal: “the company 
may apply to court for an order approving the proposal”. 108  The wording creates the 
impression that it is up to the company to decide whether or not to approach the court for an 
order approving the proposal or not.109 It does, however seem as though the purpose of the 
provision was for the company to guarantee that any dissenting creditors are in fact bound by 
the compromise. Where the creditors unanimously agree to the proposed plan no court 
sanction will be needed, since section 155(8)(c) provides that the order of court sanctioning a 
compromise is “final and binding” on all of the company’s creditors or all of the members of 
the relevant class of creditors.110 
 
The section 155 Compromise is therefore still heavily reliant on creditor involvement despite 
this procedure being primarily debtor driven. It also has certain drawbacks making the 
process one that is rarely used. The Compromise does not afford the debtor company or other 
stakeholders with the same protection, for example a moratorium against claims and 
proceedings against the company, as the Business Rescue Procedure does. The procedure 
could therefore be improved upon by incorporating some form of moratorium or stay (as is 
                                                 
107 H Klopper and R Bradstreet, “Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: does a section 155 Compromise 
Place the bar too high?” (2014) Stell LR 549- 565, at p. 553.    
108 S. 155 (7) (a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
109 H Klopper and R Bradstreet, note 107 above at pp. 553-554.  
110 S. 155(8) (c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
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afforded under Business Rescue). It could also be an expensive procedure if the debtor has to 
apply to court for an order sanctioning the proposal. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the United Kingdom the first step towards the establishment of a corporate rescue culture 
was made following the Cork Committee’s proposals by means of reforms, which led to the 
enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986. In addition, the Enterprise Act 2002 introduced 
revolutionary changes to the existing restructuring regime of the United Kingdom and 
importantly promoted a “second-chance culture” in a traditionally regarded “creditor-
friendly” jurisdiction. Finally, it has been argued that the United Kingdom’s current 
insolvency laws, in particular its restructuring and business rescue regime, are performing 
well in comparison with their international peers.   
On the other hand, corporate rescue in South Africa still has a long way to go in creating a 
rescue system that is truly reflective of a robust rescue culture. This is despite the fact that 
public opinion suggests support for the Chapter 6 provisions, which are even regarded as 
employment-preservation mechanisms. The buy-in of the larger creditors continues to be of 
paramount importance in moving towards the “second chance culture” that already exists in 
the United Kingdom. South Africa has taken remarkable strides in transforming its corporate 
rescue sphere and the progress that it has made is laudable. In conclusion, it could be argued 
that although key differences exist between the two jurisdictions, South Africa, albeit still in 
its toddler steps in establishing an effective corporate rescue, could benefit from keeping a 
close eye on the UK corporate rescue procedures and even consider whether it would be 
appropriate to incorporate similar procedures in its rescue regime.  
